Stoltenberg sieht Russland für Erhalt des INF-Vertrags in der Pflicht

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Wenn der NATO-Generalsekretär mit einer Grundsatzrede angekündigt wird, wird es meist, nun ja, grundsätzlich. Jens Stoltenberg hat allerdings mit seiner Rede am (heutigen) Montag bei der Deutsch-Atlantischen Gesellschaft in Berlin zwei Punkte gesetzt, die über das Grundsätzliche hinaus eine Position der Allianz zu zwei aktuellen Themen markieren – dem Streit um den INF-Vertrag und dem Aufruf, nicht zuletzt des französischen Präsidenten Emmanuel Macron, nach mehr europäischer strategischer Autonomie.

• Zum Abkommen zwischen den USA und Russland über die landgestützten nuklearen Mittelstreckenwaffen, dem Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)-Vertrag, hat der Generalsekretär zwar eine Ansicht, die in einem Punkt nicht so weit von der europäischer Politiker entfernt ist: Die hatten dringend für einen Erhalt des Vertrages plädiert, nachdem US-Präsident Donald Trump angekündigt hatte, dieses Abkommen von 1987 aufzukündigen. Aber, das ist das Entscheidende: Stoltenberg sieht nicht die USA, sondern Russland in der Pflicht, diesen Vertrag zu erhalten:

Over decades, arms control agreements built up trust and cut down nuclear weapons. One of these agreements was the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty. A Treaty born out of transatlantic efforts. And a cornerstone of arms control in Europe.
In the 1970s and 80s, and I see that some of you lived at that time, as did I, a whole generation of political leaders was shaped by the debate on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. And I am part of that generation.
The deployment of Soviet SS20s missiles was of profound concern.
And Germany was at the center of that debate.
Thanks to courageous politicians, such as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, NATO decided on a dual track, the double track decision. Combining firmness with dialogue.
Therefore, in 1979 NATO defense ministers decided to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet Union.
While at the same time reaching out for dialogue with the Soviet Union. That was not an easy decision. But in doing so they laid the ground for the INF treaty. Signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1987.
This didn’t just reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons. It banned a whole category of weapons that were specifically designed to target Europe. So it was a real achievement in the work for nuclear disarmament.
The deployment of new Russian missiles is putting this historic treaty in jeopardy.
For years, Russia has developed, produced, tested and fielded a new missile system. The SSC-8. These missiles are mobile. They are hard to detect.They can be nuclear-armed. They reduce warning time to minutes. They lower the threshold for nuclear conflict. And they can reach European cities like Berlin.
For years, Allies, including Germany, have raised their concerns. Time and again.
The US has raised the matter formally at senior levels more than 30 times. Starting under the Obama administration.
Allies have repeatedly pressed Russia. To ensure full, verifiable and transparent compliance. And, after years of denials, Russia now acknowledges the existence of a new missile system.
The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. So while there are no new US missiles in Europe. There are new Russian missiles.
The new Russian missile system poses a serious risk to the strategic stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.
NATO has no intention to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe. But as an Alliance we are committed to the safety and the security of all Allies. We must not allow arms control treaties to be violated with impunity. Because that undermines the trust in arms control in general.
So we call on Russia to ensure compliance, and to return to constructive dialogue with the United States.

• Zu den europäischen Überlegungen für mehr militärische Stärke Europas, insbesondere der EU, bis hin zu dem Ruf nach einer echten europäischen Armee, hat Stoltenberg eine schlichte Zahl parat: Nicht nur die USA, sondern auch Kanada, die Türkei, Norwegen und ab dem kommenden Frühjahr Großbritannien gehören zwar zur NATO, aber nicht zur Europäischen Union – mal ganz abgesehen von weiteren, etwas kleineren Nationen. Und nach dem Brexit werden, so die Zahl des NATO-Generalsekretärs, 80 Prozent der Verteidigungsausgaben in der Allianz von Staaten aufgebracht, die nicht in der EU sind. Europäische Einigkeit kann deshalb nie ein Ersatz sein für transatlantische Einigkeit:

Our security environment is challenging. And requires us all to stand strong. Therefore, increased EU efforts on defence are important for the security of Europe. And it can make NATO stronger. So I welcome these efforts. But only if they are anchored within the transatlantic partnership. Which has been the foundation for European peace and security for the past 70 years.
As we move forward on defence in Europe, we should do so in order to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. Because non-EU Allies play a central role in European security.
It is impossible to envisage the defences of Europe without countries like Turkey in the South, being key in the fight against terrorism, and all the violence and instability we have seen in Iraq and in Syria.
Norway in the North. And without Canada, the United States – and the UK – in the west. Because after Brexit, 80 percent of NATO defence spending will come from non EU NATO allies. So European unity can never be a substitute for transatlantic unity.

Die ganze Rede zum Nachlesen hier.

(Foto: NATO)