Bevor am (morgigen) Mittwoch das Bundeskabinett über die Ausweitung der deutschen Beteiligung am UN-Einsatz in Mali beschließt (faktisch über einen neuen Einsatz, der in den gefährlichen Norden führt), hier schon mal was zum Einlesen zur Situation in dem westafrikanischen Land: Der aktuelle Bericht der Generalsekretärs der Vereinten Nationen zur Lage, vorgelegt am 24. Dezember vergangenen Jahres und jetzt im Internet nachlesbar.
Aus dem United Nations Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, Kapitel Sicherheit:
While positive steps were taken towards the implementation of the peace agreement by the signatory parties, there was an increase in the number and geographical spread of activities by extremist and terrorist groups and organized crime networks, notably in Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions, as well as in Bamako. The prevalence of improvised explosive devices in northern Mali continued to put the Malian defence and security forces, French forces and United Nations personnel at risk and to seriously constrain the operations of MINUSMA. The Mission therefore continued to require convoy escorts and force protection, despite the absence of fighting between CMA and the Platform following the Anéfis talks and the ongoing efforts by the Government and the signatory armed groups to organize the cantonment process and to put mixed patrols into operation. (…)
The activities of extremist and terrorist groups also continued unabated in
northern Mali, with a total of 28 attacks, compared with 20 attacks during the previous reporting period, targeting MINUSMA using improvised explosive devices or mines. During the reporting period, hostile acts against MINUSMA resulted in the deaths of a total of 2 peacekeepers, 1 civilian staff and 1 civilian contractor, while 18 peacekeepers and 2 civilian contractors were injured. On 24 November, a MINUSMA armoured vehicle in a logistics convoy hit by an improvised explosive device 25 km west of Timbuktu resulted in the first death of a MINUSMA
civilian staff by the use of such a device. On 28 November, six rockets hit the MINUSMA camp in Kidal, killing 2 peacekeepers and 1 civilian contractor and wounding 18 peacekeepers and 2 civilian contractors. Media reports cited a senior Ansar Dine figure claiming responsibility.
MINUSMA convoys remained the primary target of extremist and terrorist
groups and transnational drug traffickers on the main supply routes between Gao
and Tessalit and between Gao and Ménaka (Gao region). On average, two out of three MINUSMA convoys between Anéfis and Gao and four out of five between Gao and Ménaka were hit by improvised explosive devices during the reporting period, damaging or destroying four MINUSMA military vehicles and three civilian-contracted trucks. Measures to counter the use of improvised explosive
devices adopted by MINUSMA, including in-depth training of troops and a revision
of the casualty evacuation procedures, prevented all but one civilian casualty. However, force protection measures, including convoy escort and camp protection, consume approximately two thirds of the Mission’s infantry capacity, seriously hampering the implementation of mandated tasks in spite of elaborate planning and the constant reprioritization of tasks, as well as the investment of significant financial and other resources.
Zusammen mit dem (morgigen) Mandat dann viel Stoff für die Debatte über den Einsatz bis zum Beschluss des Bundestages, voraussichtlich Ende Januar.
(Archivbild August 2013: A UN peacekeeper from Niger patrols the area where UN peacekeepers from Ghana are setting up tents in Gao, 1200 km North of Bamako, Mali. MINUSMA establishes a 100 men camp HQ to expand its operations in the region – Photo MINUSMA/Marco Dormino)