Die NATO bereit zum Syrien-Einsatz? (Update: Stavridis-Zitate)

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Steht die NATO bereit für einen Einsatz im Bürgerkriegsland Syrien? Am (gestrigen) Dienstag stand der NATO-Oberbefehlshaber, der US-Admiral James Stavridis, dem Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington Rede und Antwort, und dabei ging es auch um diese Frage. Die Berichterstattung über seine Aussagen variiert ein wenig.

Die russische Nachrichtenagentur RIA Novosti sieht die Allianz auf dem Weg nach Syrien:

Die Nato-Truppen sind laut dem Obersten Nato-Befehlshaber für Europa, Admiral James Stavridis, bereit,  eine Militäroperation in Syrien nach dem libyschen Muster durchzuführen, sollte dies erforderlich sein.

In der Meldung der US-Nachrichtenagentur Associated Press liest sich da etwas, nun, differenzierter:

The top U.S. military commander in Europe said Tuesday that several NATO countries are working on contingency plans for possible military action to end the two-year civil war in Syria as President Bashar Assad’s regime accused U.S.-backed Syrian rebels of using chemical weapons. (…)
Stavridis, who is retiring soon, said a number of NATO nations are looking at a variety of military operations to end the deadlock and assist the opposition forces, including using aircraft to impose a no-fly zone, providing military assistance to the rebels and imposing arms embargoes. (…)
„We are prepared if called upon to be engaged as we were in Libya,“ he said.
But within individual member countries, the admiral said, „there’s a great deal of discussion“ about lethal support to Syria, no-fly zones, arms embargoes and more. „It is moving individually within the nations, but it has not yet come into NATO as an overall NATO-type approach,“ he said.

Laut AP wies Stavridis auch darauf hin, dass ohne Beschluss des UN-Sicherheitsrats und ohne einstimmigen Beschluss der NATO-Mitglieder gar nichts passieren werde.

Zur Ergänzung der Bericht der US-Soldatenzeitung Stars and Stripes: Stavridis: More direct engagement by US could turn tide in Syria

Mit anderen Worten: Geplant wird von einigen Staaten schon; die Voraussetzungen für eine tatsächliche Aktion gibt es nicht.

Was Stavridis im Detail gesagt hat, würde mich zwar interessieren – aber die 392,50 US-Dollar, die für das Transkript seiner Anhörung verlangt werden, sind doch etwas außerhalb meiner Reichweite.

Nachtrag: Dankenswerterweise hat mir ein Leser die für das Thema bedeutsamen Passagen aus einer Abschrift der Anhörung zur Verfügung gestellt:

Extract committee hearing, March 19, of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
Chair Senator Levin. Other member in the discussion with General Stravidis on Syria were: Senator McCain, Senator Wicker, Senator Shaheen.
Relevant parts:
LEVIN: Admiral, relative to Syria, in your prepared statement, you outlined the impact of the civil war in Syria on certain parts of your AOR. Can you give us some of the NATO or European thinking as to whether or not the alliance should increase its involvement in Syria through direct lethal support to the opposition, possibly the creation of humanitarian buffer zones, and possibly the destruction of Syria’s air defenses, or part of Syria’s air defenses?
STAVRIDIS: Sir, as we all know, the Syrian situation continues to become worse and worse and worse — 70,000 killed, a million refugees pushed out of the country, probably 2.5 million internally displaced. No end in sight to a vicious civil war.
The alliance has taken a position that it will follow the same sequence that was used in Libya, which is to say prior to NATO involvement, there would have to be a U.N. Security Council resolution, regional agreement, and agreement among the 28 nations.
So within NATO channels, what we are focused on is defending that border with Syria. And as you alluded to, Chairman, in your statement, we’ve moved Patriot missiles down to do that.
In terms of what else is happening on an individual nation-by- nation basis, there’s a great deal of discussion of everything you mentioned — lethal support, no-fly zones, arms embargoes, et cetera. It is moving individually within the nations, but it has not yet come into NATO as an overall NATO-type approach. The NATO piece at the moment, again, is focused defensively, planning, being prepared, but the movement at the moment is in the individual national capitals.
LEVIN: And finally, does that movement include at least some countries that are thinking about the possibility of going after at least some of Syria’s air defense?
STAVRIDIS: Yes.
***
MCCAIN: Admiral Stavridis, last year at this hearing I asked if we — the North Atlantic Council had directed NATO to do any contingency planning, whatever for possible NATO involvement in Syria. Is NATO doing any military planning now for any potential Syria contingencies?
STAVRIDIS: Sir, we are. We are looking at a wide range of operations, and we are prepared if called upon to be engaged as — as we were in Libya.
MCCAIN: As you know, the NATO has deployed Patriot missile batteries to southern Turkey, barely — to defend Turkey against contingencies in Syria. Are those Patriot missiles capable of shooting down aircraft?
MCCAIN: Are they capable of shooting down scud missiles?
STAVRIDIS: Yes, sir, they are.
MCCAIN: Are they effective in a 20-mile range?
STAVRIDIS: Yes, sir.
MCCAIN: Can they be positioned in southern Turkey in such a way they could shoot down some of Assad’s aircraft?
STAVRIDIS: Depending on range and altitude, yes, sir.
MCCAIN: Would you agree that shooting down a few Syrian aircraft, it would serve as a powerful disincentive for pilots to fly in that area?
STAVRIDIS: I think that whenever aircraft are shot down that is a powerful disincentive.
MCCAIN: Is it your opinion, Admiral, that it is time that we help the Syrian opposition in ways that would break what is a prolonged civil war?
STAVRIDIS: I think that that option should be an is being activity explored by all the nations who are looking at this.
MCCAIN: Could I ask you personal opinion?
STAVRIDIS: You can. My personal opinion is that would be helpful in breaking the deadlock and bringing down the Assad regime.
MCCAIN: I thank you.
***
Senator Wicker?
WICKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, let me do a little followup. Senator Donnelly just asked if and when Assad falls, and you discussed his question about ethnic cleansing. If and when Assad falls, does EUCOM or NATO have contingency plans to deal with the Syrian stockpile of chemical weapons?
STAVRIDIS: EUCOM does not. That would fall under General Mattis and U.S. Central Command.
***
LEVIN:
Admiral, let me ask you some questions about Syria. The — I think the administration has shown some caution, real caution about getting more deeply involved militarily in terms of supplying arms, particularly to the opposition in Syria.
I think the fear has been that we want to make sure who those arms are getting to, first of all, and secondly that when Assad falls — I won’t say if and when, because it’s „when“ as far as I’m concerned, Assad falls, there needs to be in place or ready to be put in place by the Syrians some kind of an interim government, which would avoid chaos and anarchy in Syria so that it doesn’t fall apart; it doesn’t disintegrate; and that progress needs to be made in that direction prior to the provision of — of more lethal arms. That seems to have been the feeling of the administration.
I understand that caution and have basically shared it with a couple of caveats. One is that if Turkey were willing to provide a safe zone inside — or to assure a safe zone with NATO support along the border with Syria, but inside Syria — if Turkey were willing to do that, that I think that we ought to support that.
Secondly, I’ve favored at least consideration of going after some of Syria’s air defenses and possibly some of their air capability itself.
LEVIN: We heard an interesting idea today, probably not from his kind for the first time. I think Senator McCain is probably further along in this line than perhaps most of our colleagues. I thought it was a very intriguing set of questions of his when he asked about the capability of the Patriot missiles, as to whether or not they essentially could defend a zone along that border, perhaps 20 miles wide, from Syrian aircraft from Turkish territory with the Patriot missiles. And your answers were very — it seems to me illuminating that yes there could be that kind of protection of a — I think you indicated or he indicated — a 20 mile wide zone or not.

And I think that really is subject to some very serious consideration, myself, because I think we have to step up the military — our — our military effort against Assad in some ways, whether it’s some kind of a safe zone that we help protect along the border inside of Syria, whether it’s going after their air defenses, or whether it’s going after some of their air force.
Would Turkey, do you believe, support the use of the Patriot missiles in that manner to help protect a safe zone in Turkey — I’m sorry — in Syria along that border?
STAVRIDIS: Again, I’m not expert on — on Syria. From the perspective of the — our Turkish colleagues, whenever they have talked to us about the use of the Patriots, they have been very emphatic that they would be defensive. That’s the — the role they have continued to say is paramount in their view, because I think they are loathe to be dragged into the Syrian conflict by an inadvertent incident of some kind.
Having said that, as I told Senator McCain, the capability is there. It would have to be first and foremost a Turkish decision, since it’s there sovereign soil. If it were to be a NATO mission, it would then need to come into NATO for dialogue and so forth. And, as I was discussing with Senator Wicker, that’ll require 28 nation consensus.
So, it would be a complicated process, but I think this range of options are certainly under discussion in a lot of the capitals.
LEVIN: Would you — would you take back that option if it isn’t already under consideration to the — our NATO allies, starting with Turkey?
Turkey has suggested, I believe, that she would be willing to help create and then protect a zone, a narrow band inside of Syria along the Turkish border, where Syrians could go for safety instead of all flowing across the border. So it’d be, I think, an interesting — obviously important and essential — but interesting to find what the — Turkey’s response would be to such a proposal.
And if there is a positive response there or willingness to even consider it, can you take that up with other NATO countries and the possible use of those Patriots?
STAVRIDIS: Yes, sir.
LEVIN: Because I — I think it’s a — kind of a real possibility that we ought to explore.
STRAVIDIS: Now, then to follow up on Senator McCain. He had an interesting line of questioning with regard to the placement of Patriot batteries in Turkey. Who put those Patriot batteries there, Admiral?
STAVRIDIS: Those are on NATO mission. They were assigned by the NATO alliance. There are three nations that have contributed batteries. The United States is in a place called Gaziantep. Germany is in a place called Kahramanmaras. And the Dutch are in place called Adana. All of these are located in southwestern Turkey along the border, Senator.
WICKER: OK. And was this a decision that — that was reached by the NATO leadership? Or did we do that individually with — with those two allies of ours?
STAVRIDIS: It was a NATO decision and this is a NATO mission. In fact, although those are the three nations that have contributed the actual batteries, the entire 28 member nations have people that are part of this mission. For example, the command and control is made up of people from all the different countries, connected back through the operational chain into headquarters. So it’s very much a NATO mission.
WICKER: What did it take within NATO to make that decision?

STAVRIDIS: We had to bring it into the NATO Council, which is 28 nations. They’re represented by ambassadors in Belgium. It was discussed there. Then those ambassadors went back to capitals, got approval for it, and then the operational task began.
I — I would say that sounds like quite a process, but…
WICKER: It does.
STAVRIDIS: … well, but we did it in about a month. In other words, from the time the Turkish nation asked for the Patriots to be in place to the time the first Patriot batteries were in place was just about a month.
WICKER: What level of unanimity was required within NATO to do that?
STAVRIDIS: All 28 nations had to agree.
WICKER: OK. So, do I take it, then, from the tone of your answer that you’re — you’re comfortable with our having to rely on that level of required consensus in our past dealings with the Libyan issue and currently with Syria? Or has that been cumbersome? And has it stood in the way of us making efficient decisions?
STAVRIDIS: As I look back on four years as the NATO commander for operations, I look at all the things we’ve done — Afghanistan, counter-piracy, the current Syria mission with the Patriots, the Balkans. We’ve typically got 150,000 people out doing five or six operations around the world at any given moment. All of those decisions have been done by consensus.
There have been times when that has been frustrating and there have been times when it takes consensus-building, just like it does in any deliberative body. But as I look back on four years, I would say that it is reasonably effective at delivering operational capability.
Having said all that, there are always going to be times when each nation must reserve to itself the right to act immediately. The United States has done that. I think we will continue to do that. We’re not bound by NATO, but when we want to bring NATO along, we go into this process and, again, looking back on four years, it’s been reasonably successful in delivering capability for operations.
WICKER: The United States has not done that, though, with regard to Syria policy.
STAVRIDIS: It has not done that with regard to Syria. That’s correct. It did it with regard to Libya, for example.
WICKER: In what respect?
STAVRIDIS: In the sense that the Libyan operation began as a series of unilateral coalition-of-the-willing operations, initially the French and the British. U.S. jumped in. Italians came in. At that point after about 10 days to two weeks of that coalition-of-the- willing operation, NATO stepped up and took over that operation and then ran the Libyan operation for the next nine months.
WICKER: Now, with regard to Senator McCain’s specific question about those Patriot batteries being used to knock down Syrian military aircraft, at this point our position is that that would require this type of NATO consensus decision.
STAVRIDIS: That’s correct. That is correct.
WICKER: And we’re far from that.
STAVRIDIS: That is correct.
***
LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator King.

We’re going to have a brief second round. I think one of our colleagues is on her way here also, so she can have her first round, of course, when she gets here.
Admiral, let me ask you some questions about Syria. The — I think the administration has shown some caution, real caution about getting more deeply involved militarily in terms of supplying arms, particularly to the opposition in Syria.
I think the fear has been that we want to make sure who those arms are getting to, first of all, and secondly that when Assad falls — I won’t say if and when, because it’s „when“ as far as I’m concerned, Assad falls, there needs to be in place or ready to be put in place by the Syrians some kind of an interim government, which would avoid chaos and anarchy in Syria so that it doesn’t fall apart; it doesn’t disintegrate; and that progress needs to be made in that direction prior to the provision of — of more lethal arms. That seems to have been the feeling of the administration.
I — I understand that caution and have basically shared it with a couple of caveats. One is that if Turkey were willing to provide a safe zone inside — or to assure a safe zone with NATO support along the border with Syria, but inside Syria — if Turkey were willing to do that, that I think that we ought to support that.
STAVRIDIS: I — I can. I — I’d actually start by looking back for a moment. If we look back 10 to 15 years ago, we saw disaster in the Balkans, comparable to what we see in Syria today. In that period of time, we saw 8,000 men and boys killed, in Srebrenica, a matter of days. We saw genocide. A saw 100,000 people killed, millions pushed across borders, two major wars.
Flash forward to today. Instead of reaching for a gun to resolve a dispute in the Balkans today, the nations are reaching for the telephone. They are under the auspices of the European Union. As you allude to, Senator, we see Kosovo and Serbia at the table. They’re prime ministers at the table. They’re presidents at the table, led by Baroness Catherine Ashton the European Union’s head of foreign affairs, if you will.
I think, we’re very close to a — a — a real settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. That will allow us to draw down our forces in KFOR Kosovo. Today we have about 6,000 there. When I came into the job four years ago, we had 15,000. That’s, in and of itself, a sign of real progress. If the talks bear fruit, I think we’ll be able to drive that force down as early as late this year. So, stay tuned. I think there’s more progress ahead in the Balkans.
SHAHEEN: That’s very encouraging. It’s also encouraging to think that, hopefully, if we’re 15 years out from the current crisis in Syria, that we might see some similar progress, which would…
STAVRIDIS: Hopefully faster, but, yes, I agree.

 

(Foto: Stavridis in Finnland im Mai 2012 – Department of Defense Photo)