Lesestoff: Estland geht von russischer Bereitschaft zur Konfrontation mit der NATO aus

Russland verstärkt nach Einschätzung des estnischen Auslandsgeheimdienstes seine Truppen an den Grenzen zu den baltischen Staaten und dem neuen NATO-Mitglied Finnland. Moskau richte sich offensichtlich auf eine militärische Auseinandersetzung mit der Allianz in den nächsten zehn Jahren ein.

Der Auslandsgeheimdienst (Välisluureamet) legte am (heutigen) Dienstag seinen jährlichen Bericht vor (auch auf Englisch). In der Übersicht unter dem Titel Internationale Sicherheit und Estland 2024 werden vor allem die Auswirkungen einer geplanten russischen Militärreform analysiert, die sich vor allem auf den Norden Europas auswirken könnte.

Eine der Kernaussagen in dem Bericht:

The objectives of Russia’s military reform reflect the leadership’s vision of the resources required for the conflict with Ukraine and prolonged confrontation with the West.
Russia presents its military reform as a response to NATO’s expansion, probably anticipating a possible conflict with the alliance within the next decade.
Russia’s goal is to achieve military dominance in the Baltic Sea region. For Estonia, Russia’s military reform entails a significant increase in Russian forces near the Estonian border in the coming years.

Die Konsequenzen sind aus Sicht des estnischen Dienstes, dass ungeachtet der generellen Bemühung um eine Verstärkung der russischen Streitkräfte die Hauptanstrengungen gegen den Westen gerichtet sind: If Russia manages to implement the reform, NATO could face a Soviet-style mass army in the next decade. Der ganze Abschnitt im Kontext:

Although Russia plans to strengthen all strategic directions, including organising naval infantry brigades into divisions and establishing five regional artillery divisions, the highest priority for force generation lies in the Western strategic direction and Ukraine. The Kremlin is preparing for a prolonged conflict with Ukraine, necessitating additional armies and army corps (3rd and 40th Army Corps, 18th Army and 25th Army), for which dozens of new manoeuvre, combat support and combat service support units are being formed.
The second priority region is the Finnish direction, where Russia’s military posture was minimal until Finland’s recent accession to NATO. Russia plans to create the 44th Army Corps, likely based in Petrozavodsk, to address this. This formation will probably be built around at least two or three manoeuvre units with around a dozen fire support and combat support units.
The growth of Russian military capabilities in Estonia’s vicinity in the Leningrad and Pskov Oblasts primarily results from the potential transformation of existing units into divisions. According to one possible scenario, the personnel strength of Russian land forces and airborne troops in the Estonian direction may nearly double from approximately 19,000 before 24 February 2022. The extent to which these units will achieve combat readiness depends on Russia’s ability to recruit, train and retain contracted service members.
The success and timeline of Russia’s military reform will be largely determined by the course of the war in Ukraine. If Russia manages to implement the reform, NATO could face a Soviet-style mass army in the next decade. This army is likely to be technologically inferior to NATO allies’ defence forces in most areas, except for electronic warfare and long-range strike capabilities. However, its military potential would be significant, owing to its size, firepower (including artillery and numerous inexpensive combat drones), combat experience and reserves. Defending against a possible conventional attack from such an army would require allied defence forces and defence industries to be significantly more prepared, capable and better-stocked with ammunition and materiel than they currently are.