Merkposten: NATO auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Nuklearstrategie?


Es ist bislang nur ein vorsichtiger Merkposten: Die Wahrnehmung in der NATO, dass Russland über einen Einsatz von Atomwaffen auf deutlich niedrigerer Schwelle als bisher nachdenke, stößt auch in der Allianz ein Nachdenken über eine geänderte Nuklearstrategie an.

Dazu zwei aktuelle Veröffentlichungen – noch alles am Anfang, aber vielleicht der Anfang von grundlegenden Veränderungen?

Center for Strategic & International Studies:
NATO’s Nuclear Policy as Part of a Revitalized Deterrence Strategy

NATO should not try to mirror Russia’s increasingly irresponsible nuclear behavior. Instead, it is time for NATO to develop a clearer nuclear declaratory policy to complement the steps underway to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces.

USNI News:
Panel: Russian Nuclear Saber Rattling Prompting NATO to Rethink Its Role

Russia’s blurring of the line between using tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in a crisis coupled with its saber-rattling statements is compelling the United States and its NATO allies to rethink their positions on deterrence, modernization and conventional forces, four national security experts told a key Senate panel. (…)
What has changed is Russia’s adoption of a strategy in spring 2014 of escalate using low-yield nuclear weapons to conclude a standoff in its favor. Putin said he had considered doing employing the tactic in earlier conflicts.

Im (heute vorgelegten) Bericht von NATO-Generalsekretär Jens Stoltenberg ist von Veränderungen noch nicht die Rede, allerdings wird auf entsprechende Übungen Russlands verwiesen:

A core element of NATO’s collective defence is deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities. As the security environment changes, NATO adapts its policies and ensures it has the capabilities required to implement them. (…)
As part of its overall military build-up, the pace of Russia’s military manoeuvres and drills have reached levels unseen since the height of the Cold War. Over the past three years, Russia has conducted at least 18 large-scale snap exercises, some of which have involved more than 100,000 troops. These exercises include simulated nuclear attacks on NATO Allies (eg, ZAPAD) and on partners (eg, March 2013 simulated attacks on Sweden), and have been used to mask massive movements of military forces (February 2014 prior to the illegal annexation of Crimea) and to menace Russia’s neighbours.

Das Thema wird uns vermutlich demnächst noch öfter beschäftigen.

(Archivbild: B-52H Stratofortress, schwerer Bomber der U.S. Air Force, der auch für den Einsatz von Atomwaffen vorgesehen ist – U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Lance Cheung)