Lesestoff/Sammler: Zapad 2021

Die russischen Streitkräfte, zusammen mit Belarus, haben ihre Großübung Zapad 2021 begonnen – Zapad (deutsche Schreibweise: Sapad) steht für Westen und ist Teil einer regelmäßigen Übungsserie in allen russischen Militärdistrikten, die turnusmäßig in diesem Jahr wieder an der Westgrenze Russland (und damit an der Ostflanke der NATO) stattfindet. In diesem Jahr verdient sie angesichts der Situation in Belarus (Weißrussland) noch ein wenig mehr Aufmerksamkeit; deshalb ein Sammler mit Lesestoff:

Wie bei den vorangegangenen Übungen dieser Art – zuletzt Zapad 2017 – beginnt die Wahrnehmung dieser Großübung mit einem Blick auf verwirrende Zahlen: So werden von den russischen Streitkräften in der Regel einerseits hohe Truppenzahlen genannt, andererseits recht niedrige Zahlen an die OSZE gemeldet, um nicht ab einer Größe von 13.000 Soldaten internationale Beobachter nach dem Wiener Dokument zulassen zu müssen. Das spielt bei allen offiziellen Angaben eine Rolle und wird von russischer Seite auch hervorgehoben – in diesem Jahr mit dem Hinweis, bei den Übungen unter einheitlichem Kommando auf russischem Territorium seien es jeweils weniger als 6.400 Soldaten.

Zum Beginn des Manövers am (heutigen) Freitag der Überblick auf der englischsprachigen Webseite des russischen Verteidigungsministeriums:

The joint strategic exercise Zapad-2021 has started in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus

Practical actions of the troops (forces) started simultaneously at nine ranges – Kirilovsky, Strugi Krasnye, Mulino, Pogonovo, Khmelevka, Pravdinsky, Dobrovolsky, Dorogobuzh and Volsky, located on the territory of the Russian Federation, in the Baltic Sea, as well as at five ranges in the Republic of Belarus – Obuz – Lesnovsky, Brest, Chepelevo, Domanovsky and Ruzhansky.
The joint strategic exercise Zapad-2021 involves about 200 thousand military personnel, more than 80 aircraft and helicopters, up to 760 units of military equipment, including more than 290 tanks, more than 240 guns, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, as well as up to 15 ships.
Of these, 12,800 people, including up to 2,500 Russian servicemen, more than 30 aircraft and helicopters, up to 350 units of military equipment, including about 140 tanks, up to 110 guns, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, are involved in the exercise on the territory of the Republic of Belarus.
From the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other friendly countries, about 2 thousand military personnel take part in the Zapad-2021 exercise as part of the created coalition group of troops.
At the same time, the maximum number of personnel involved in the exercise of military units under a single operational command subject to the 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence-Building and Security Measures in the territory of the Russian Federation will not exceed 6,400 people, respectively.
The objectives of the exercise are to check the level of readiness and ability of the military command bodies of the troops (forces) of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation to take joint actions in solving the tasks of ensuring military security and territorial integrity of the Union State, their interaction during combat operations; to get practice by commanders, commanders and headquarters for the management of troops (forces) during joint actions to repel aggression against the Union State.

Bereits am ersten Tag gab es eine Serie von Mitteilungen (auch auf Englisch) dazu:

For the first time, the Airborne troops will land a full-fledged parachute battalion on modern BMD-4M during the JSE Zapad-2021
Air defence units of the WMD took up combat duty in new positional areas within the framework of the JSE Zapad-2021
The ships of the Baltic Fleet went to sea to perform tasks within the framework of the JSE Zapad-2021
During the exercise Zapad-2021, the land units of the Baltic Fleet will work out actions in defence
Russian paratroopers within the framework of the JSE Zapad-2021 have started organizing interaction in equipped field control points at the Brestsky and Obuz-Lesnovsky ranges
Russian paratroopers at the training grounds in Belarus during the JSE Zapad-2021 use the latest mobile security systems for military facilities
A multi-level intelligence system has been created at combined-arms ranges within the framework of the JSE Zapad-2021
The headquarters of the coalition group of troops created as part of the joint strategic exercise Zapad-2021 has started working at the Mulino training ground
At the exercise Zapad-2021, the air defence units of the WMD successfully repelled a massive air strike of a mock enemy
During the strategic exercises Zapad-2021, motorized infantry units of the army corps of the Baltic Fleet worked out maneuverable defence
During the strategic exercises Zapad-2021, motorized infantry units of the army corps of the Baltic Fleet worked out maneuverable defence
Servicemen of the Russian military police have started duty as part of the exercise Zapad-2021 in the Republic of Belarus
The mobile field control point of the 6th combined arms army of the WMD is deployed in the Nizhny Novgorod region as part of the JSE Zapad-2021

Das dürfte in den nächsten Tagen so weiter gehen und eine Vielzahl von Detailangaben liefern. Deshalb ein Schritt zurück und der Blick auf die Übung insgesamt:

Von der größten Militärübung in Europa seit 40 Jahren spricht das Warschauer Centre for Eastern Studies (und legt dabei die offizielle Angabe zur Gesamtzahl zu Grunde). Und die Ausgangssituation der Übung? Da hat das OCW eine klare Einschätzung:

The Zapad-2021 strategic exercises, scheduled for 10–16 September, are the most important training programme yet undertaken held by the Russian Armed Forces and the Belarusian army which cooperates with them. As they involve as many as 200,000 soldiers, they will also be the largest military exercises conducted in Europe for nearly 40 years. The training phase actually began in July, and will peak during the officially announced dates. The accompanying disinformation operation began even earlier, at the end of 2020; the aim was to present the exercises as a defensive action by the alliance of Belarus and Russia against allegedly rising aggression by NATO. The Zapad-2021 (zapad meaning ‘west’) exercises are a test of how ready the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus are to conduct operations on NATO’s eastern flank, but they also represent a test of the state structures, in terms of the comprehensive security of their activities and operation in conditions of armed conflict. Particular importance should be attached to the attempt at verifying how effective both countries will be at conducting information warfare, the goal of which is to confirm the potential enemy in the belief that Russia is militarily superior, and that it is ready to use force for political purposes.

Mit den Details von Zapad 2021 hat sich auch das US-Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), dem unter anderem der frühere Kommandeur der U.S. Army Europe Ben Hodges angehört, eingehender befasst:

Taming the Bear: Russia’s Huge Exercises Test NATO Resolve

(…) Historically, Zapad exercises are significant undertakings that allow Russia to test new war-fighting tactics and emphasize capabilities comparable to NATO’s in the region while conveying the potential of Russian military menace to its neighbors. This year, Russia is expected to use the exercise to try and project Russian military dominance in a potential conflict with Ukraine or NATO. Demonstrating interoperability across national militaries and combat units — especially Belarus, and with new countries like India, Kyrgyzstan, and China — will also be key. Improved relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka suggest that the exercise may be used to permanently station more Russian forces and equipment in Belarus.

und zum maritimen Aspekt

Zapad-21: The Bear at Sea

These operations at sea create the possibility of close interactions between NATO and Russian forces, which have to be carefully managed. However, naval operations as they occur from the High North to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean will offer insight into the global, strategic aspects of Russia’s exercise.
Defending Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave will almost certainly be included in the exercise scenario, leading to increased maritime and air operations on and over the Baltic Sea, and training at coastal defense sites. Logistic activities supporting Kaliningrad have already been noted.
In the constrained waters of the Baltic Sea, there is a risk of miscalculation in interactions between Western and Russian warships. During Zapad’s period of intensive military activity, Russian units may be more likely to engage in unsafe and unprofessional actions if NATO naval forces are in the vicinity. The June harassment of HMS Defender and HNLMS Evertsen near Crimea was quite intentional; escalation due to miscalculations and unsafe operations may be even more dangerous.

Die erwähnte Beteiligung weiterer Staaten ist bei der Zapad-Übungsreihe nicht unbedingt ungewöhnlich; interessant ist da natürlich Indien.

Im Laufe der Übung wird’s vermutlich mehr Infos/Material geben. Allerdings: Schon bei Zapad 2017 hatte es zuvor große Analysen gegeben, was kommen könnte. Hinterher gab es weit weniger – oder, wahrscheinlicher: Es gab weit weniger öffentlich dazu zu lesen, das meiste war vermutlich eingestuft. Mit der kleinen Ausnahme der politischen, nicht militärischen Besonderheit Spitzbergen.

Ergänzungen: Diese US-Analyse bei War on the Rocks gehört natürlich zum Lesestoff:

Zapad-2021: What to Expect From Russia’s Strategic Military Exercise

Belarusian official sources have offered a glimpse of the scenario for 2021: As the military and political situation in Europe deteriorates, Western states turn their attention to Belarus and having failed to destabilize Belarus via non-military means, this Western coalition decides to use force to achieve its political aims. The Russian-Belarusian Northern coalition must compel this Western group to terminate hostilities on acceptable terms. This year, the Western coalition comprises states called Nyaris, Pomoria, and the Polar Republic along with so-called terrorist organizations. This is an interesting development. While Nyaris appears to represent Lithuania and Pomoria is probably a stand-in for Poland, the Polar Republic is likely intended to represent Norway or another Scandinavian state, heralding a significant role in Zapad-2021 for Russia’s Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command. Zapad-2021 will be held across Belarus at five training ranges in Brest, Baranovichi, Domanovsky, Obuz-Lesnovsky, Ruzhanskiy, and the region surrounding Grodno. Many of these ranges are in western Belarus, near the border with Poland and Lithuania. Another nine training ranges in Russia will be involved, and the Northern Fleet also will have an important part to play during this exercise.

… und diese Vorfeld-Analyse des US-Center for Strategic and International Studies hatte ich noch übersehen:

Russia Goes to War: Exercises, Signaling, War Scares, and Military Confrontations

(…) What the most recent troop redeployments into the Western Military District (WMD) have highlighted is that, within a month, Russia can redeploy units from other districts to create a favor-able conventional balance ratio at chosen axes, including against the Baltic States. However, not all Rus-sian large-scale, strategic-operational, or readiness exercises are a prelude to military intervention. Some Russian military exercises are simply training activities; others seek to signal Russian resolve to maintain the status quo; and the rest serve domestic and international propaganda purposes. The upcoming “ZaRussia Goes to War: Exercises, Signaling, War Scares, and Military Confrontations | 2
pad-2021” exercise is likely to tick all of these boxes, although the main focus could be placed on the defense of Belarus, highlighting the advances made in the Belarus-Russia defense relationship.

Und noch ein Nachtrag – ein Blick des Russland-Experten des European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Gustav Gressel, auf die Implikationen der Übung für die Länder an der Ostflanke der NATO:

The Belarusian Springboard – what Zapad drills with Russia mean for Baltics?

(…) In the past, logistical preparations and deployment of Russian troops into Belarus, activation of military infrastructure were signals indicating hostile Russian intentions – but a signal the West could read, and that would be readable for at least weeks prior to military actions.
If Russian forces would continue to use military sites in Belarus and regularly rotate formations in and out to serve them, this would create a constant clutter or movements that are much harder to read. In this situation, the alliance needs to reassess whether it can continue to “balance from a distance” relying on reserves to be brought into theatre in crisis, and even if, what consequences for readiness levels and force posture, and to be developed capabilities are to be drawn?
Particularly for the Baltic countries, but also for Ukraine, the level of military insecurity has increased.

(Grafik: Logo der Übung Zapad 2021 – Russisches Verteidigungsministerium)